Firstly, he inquires about the enforcement hold that the node has on the sender of the incoming HTLC when the node has already forwarded the HTLC onward. Secondly, ZmnSCPxj asks about the possibility of deliberately deferring claiming the incoming HTLC by a forwarding node with an intention to reduce the amount to be refunded after it settles. He suggests the idea of growing trust between intermediate nodes and peers by increasing the limits of incoming HTLCs. He proposes that the intermediate nodes should limit incoming HTLCs from peers that have not given them many successful forwards and earned forwarding fees from those forwards. If the outgoing HTLC is claimed quickly rather than slowly and the node earns a good amount of fee, they might increase the limits of incoming HTLCs for the new peer, effectively "growing trust". However, he is also cautious about the possibility of exit scams where attackers manipulate intermediate nodes into increasing their trust score and later scamming them. Therefore, he suggests that the system functions like pre-paid fees, where the pre-payment is in the actual pay-on-successful-forwarding of previous HTLCs forwarded by a node.