Nodes will need to build a reputation before they can command hold fees, and routing nodes that have a strong relation may decide not to charge hold fees at all. However, an attacker could establish channels with low-reputation nodes and use them to grief a high-reputation node by jamming up their channels, while the low-reputation nodes pay for it. To deter this, LOW-REP nodes should still charge unknown nodes a hold fee but waive it for high-reputation nodes. Operators of high-reputation nodes can even make this profitable by eliminating the chance of any low-reputation nodes ever becoming high-reputation. There is a concern that penalizing the direct peer creates a bias against forwarding unknown payments, thus deanonymizing. However, if an honest but unknown sender pays the hold fee, there shouldn't be a problem. The mechanism can create interesting dynamics on the network and reach an equilibrium that is still healthy in terms of decentralization and privacy.